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Introduction
There  has been substantial progress in estimating  the extent to which
monetary  policy  actions  affect economic  activity particularly  in devel-
oped  countries  (Christiano  et al.  1999; Bayoumi  and  Morsink  1999;
Bernanke  and  Mihov  1998; Ramaswamy  and  Sloek 1997; Sims 1992).
For instance, Bernanke and Gertler  (1995) estimate that a positive one
standard  deviation  shock to the Federal funds rate causes  it to increase
to  about  50 basis points  that  result  to  a decline  in  US  real  GDP of
about 0.19 percent.  In Japan, Bayoumi and Morsink  (1999) estimated
an implied  interest rate multiplier  of about minus 0.6 i,n  GDP. There  is
far less consensus, however, on how monetary  policy  actions operate
in the economies of developing  countries  such as the Asian countries.
With  their  recent experience  in the 1997 crisis and the  International
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)-supported  monetary  policy stance that spurred
discussions or  monetary  policy  transmission mechanism, understand-
ing the process by which  monetary  policy actions are transmitted  into
their  economy is worth  undertaking.
The  research study by Ghosh and Philips  (1999) provides  initial
estimates of the impact ofa  monetary  contraction  on real GDP growth
in Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,  and Thailand.  They find
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that  a 10 percentage  point  decrease in  the  growth  of  real  money is
estimated  to  lower  the  current  real GDP growth  rate  by about 1 per-
centage point  in Thailand  and the Philippines,  by 1.5 percentage points
in Malaysia, and by 3 percentage points  in Korea. The  impact  in Indo-
nesia occurs  with  a one-year lag falling  by 1 percentage  point.  The
study used real money growth as a measure of monetary  policy stance
and the estimates were based on annual data from  1972 to 1996.1  This
study, however, can be criticized  on two grounds. First, the use of money
growth  as an indicator  of  monetary  policy  stance poses some prob-
lems. Recent financial  innovation,  deregulation,  and other factors made
secular changes in the velocity of  moneymaking  it inadequate  to be a
measure of the  direction  of policy.  In  addition,  growth  rates of mon-
etary aggregates are being affected by a variety of nonpolicy  influences
(Bernanke  and  Mihov  1998).2 Second, the  study does not provide  fur-
ther  analysis on  the  transmission  mechanism  of  monetary  policy  in
these countries.
This paper approaches the issue on monetary transmission mecha-
nism  in  Korea,  the  Philippines,  and  Thailand  from  a different  per-
spective. Also, it uses a short-term  interest rate as an indicator  of mon-
etary policy stance as opposed to a monetary aggregate. In addition,  it
attempts to provide  a more detailed  analysis of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism  in these countries.  In this regard,  it poses three ques-
tions. First, to what extent  does, say,  monetary  policy  tightening  affect
economic  activity?  Second, which  components  of  GDP are greatly af-
fected  by this  monetary  policy  tightening?  Finally,  how do  other  eco-
nomic  variables  respond  to  such monetary  policy  action?  Do  credit
market conditions  playa  role  in the  propagation  of these shocks?
This  paper seeks  to shed light  on these questions using a series of
vector  autoregression  (VAR) models. The  following  section explains
the  methodology  and  data used in the  analysis. The  succeeding  sec-
tion proceeds with the discussion of the results of this exercise. A sum-
mary of the  main findings  and some policy implications  are provided
in the  concluding  section.
Methodology  and data
This  paper examines the  transmission  mechanism  of monetary  policy
, Quarterly  data  for  the  same  period  were  likewise  utilized  but only  for  Korea  and  the  Philippines.
2  For other  problems  on the  use  of monetary  aggregates  to identify  policy  shocks,  see Sims  1980;  Litterman
and  Weiss  1985;  Reichenstein  1987;  Leeper  and  Gordon  1992;  Bernanke  and  Blinder  1992;  and  Strongin
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economic  variables within  the  current  period,  i.e. Co=O.  In this case, p
comes last in the VAR ordering.  The  ordering  of variables in the sys-
tem implies  that current  shocks to the policy stance measure are asthe
other  variables  in the system. The  resulting  system is then  estimated
by standard  VAR methods  followed  by a  Choleski  decomposition  of
the  covariance  matrix.  This  yields  an estimated  series for  the  exog-
enous policy  shock v" and impulse  response functions  for  all the vari-
ables in the  system with  respect to  the  policy  shock  v,  can be calcu-
lated and interpreted  as the true  structural  responses to policy shocks.
The  baseline  model is then extended  in a number  of directions
so one can further  examine the  transmission  mechanism  of monetary
policy  shocks. First, the  real  output  variable  is replaced  by its  major
components.  By doing  so, one identifies  which  components are greatly
affected  by, say, monetary  policy  tightening.  Initially,  the response of
private  consumption  and fixed  capital investment were examined. The
analysis is then extended  through  a look  at their  components.  For pri-
vate consumption,  we consider  the  responses of durable  and nondu-
rable  consumption.  For fixed  capital  investment,  construction  invest-
ment and  equipment  investment are analyzed.
Second, monetary aggregates and indicators  of credit market con-
ditions  are included  in the baseline VAR. The lending  rate and a proxy
variable  for  the  external  finance  premium  (EFP) are used as indica-
tors  of  credit  market  conditions.  The  EFP reflects  imperfections  in
the  credit  markets  that  drive  a wedge between  the  expected  return
received  by  lenders  and  the  costs  faced  by  potential  borrowers
(Bernanke  and Gertler 1995). The  variable,  therefore,  is a risk indica-
tor  and  may signal difficulty  in obtaining  credit.  In this study, EFP is
proxied  by the  difference  between  lending  rates and  deposit  rates4
(Bernanke  and  Gertler  1995).
An issue relating  to the estimation  of the VAR model is the speci-
fication  of variables in the system, that is, whether  the variables are to
be specified  in its stationary  form  or not.  A system  specified  in differ-
ences (to  make  it  stationary)  when the  time  series are nonstationary
will generate  efficient  estimates. However, the true process may not be
a VAR in differences.  In this  case, the  system is misspecified.  On  the
'In  the Philippines, the difference between the deposit and lending rate may not be a good indicator of the
external risk premium, because deposit rates are usually set by oligopolistic forces and have been artifi-
cially low for a very long time. However, the absence of long time series data for other proxy variables
limits the study to the above variables233 POBRE
other  hand,  in a VAR system specified  in  levels, parameters  are esti-
mated  consistently and have the same asymptotic  distribution  as  would
estimates be on differenced  data. This is also true even if the true model
is a VAR in differences  (Hamilton  1994).  Lutkepohl  (1991) and Doan
(1996) provide  additional  arguments why specification  in levels is more
appropriate  than  specification  in  differences.  For these reasons, the
empirical  literature  on  monetary  transmission  mechanism  has speci-
fied  the  variables  in  its  level  form  (Bernanke  and  Blinder  1992;
Christiano  et al. 1996; Leeper  et al. 1996). This  study likewise follows
this specification.
This  study chose the countries  where quarterly  national  accounts
data are available. Hence the  inclusion  of Korea, the Philippines,  and
Thailand.  The  sample period  runs  from  the  first  quarter  of 1981 to
the third  quarter  of  2000 for Korea and the Philippines  and from  the
first  quarter  of  1993 to  the  third  quarter  of 2000 for  Thailand.  The
policy  stance measure is represented  by the  money  market  rate  for
Korea, Treasury bill  rate  for  the  Philippines,  arid the  overnight  lend-
ing rate  for Thailand.  These short-term  interest  rates have continued
to playa  significant  role  in the  conduct  of monetary  policy  in Korea,
the Philippines  and Thailand  (Van't  Dack 1999).  Except for the inter-
est rates and the exchange rate,  all variables  in the  system  are in  real
values and are seasonally adjusted via the US Bureau  of Census X-II
methods.5
Results
In  the  succeeding  analyses, the study applies a positive  one standard
deviation  shock to the  policy  stance equation,  and this is interpreted
as a monetary  tightening.  The plots  of the impulse response functions
reflect  the movements of the macroeconomic  variables in the baseline
model  to  this positive  shock. As output  and  its components  are mea-
sured  in  logs,  the  responses can  be  interpreted  as proportions  of
baseline levels. The  baseline VAR model is estimated  with  the follow-
ing ordering  of variables:  real GDP, GDP deflator,  the exchange  rate,
and the  policy  rate.6 For all  countries,  the SBC information  criterion
(LutkepohI1991;  Hamilton  1994) chooses a I-lag  order  for  the VAR
system. Results are discussed below.
'See  data  appendix  for  details
'Impulse  Response  Functions  derived  from  different  orderings  of variables  in the VAR  system  and  differ
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Monetary policy shocks
This  paper first  looks  at the  monetary  policy shocks derived  from  the
baseline models  in Korea, the Philippines,  and Thailand.  These mon-
etary policy  shocks may be used to characterize  the  monetary  policy
conditions  in  these  countries.  It  is considered  "tight"  or  "contrac-
tionary"  when the  policy  shock is positive, and "loose"  or "expansion-
ary" when  the  shock is negative. Figure  1 plots the  Qehavior of these
monetary  policy shocks.
For the whole  sample period,  monetary  policy shocks appear to
be most idiosyncratic  in the Philippines  than in Korea based on their
standard  deviations.  The  monetary  policy  shocks in  the  Philippines
have a standard  deviation  of 3.16 while  policy shocks in Korea have a
standard  deviation  of 1.73. The  high  standard  deviation  of  monetary
policy  shocks in the  Philippines  is likely  influenced  by the  high  vari-
ance of  these shocks during  the  crisis  that  hit  the  country  in  1984.
Figure 1.  Monetary policy  shocksPODRE 235
However, we see a different  picture  when we focus  the  observation
only for  the period  1993-2000. The  standard  deviation  for  the Philip-
pines reduces to 1.85. This is now lower compared  to Korea and Thai-
land which have 1.97 and 2.29, respectively, corresponding  to the stan-
dard  deviation  of their  monetary  policy shocks.
Taking a closer look  at the behaviors of these policy shocks dur-
ing the  recent  crisis period,  monetary  policy  conditions  in the  three
countries  appear to be relatively "tight"  or "contractionary"  (very tight,
in fact, at least for Korea and Thailand)  compared  to other periods  in
the '90s. Korea reached the peak of its policy shocks sometime  toward
the  end of the  last quarter  of 1997 and Thailand,  sometime  between
the second and third  quarters  of  1997. In terms of the  short-term  in-
terest rates, Korea experienced  the  most abrupt  increase on its inter-
est rate from  16.44 percent  in the fourth  quarter  of 1997 to 23.93 per-
cent  in  the  first  quarter  of  1998 while  the  Philippines  and Thailand
had a high  of 17.83 percent and 20.64 percent,  respectively during  the
first  quarter  of 1998. Figure 2 plots the movements of these short-term
interest  rates.
For  Korea  and  Thailand,  the  periods  of  high  monetary  policy
shocks and policy rates during  the crisis period  coincide  with the time
when these countries  began their  stabilization  programs with the IMF.7
Country case  results
Korea  (1981-2000)
Figure  3a plots  the impulse  response functions  of the baseline  model
in Korea. The positive one standard deviation shock to the policy stance
equation  causes the  money  market  rate  to  increase  to  1.29 percent
immediately  following  the policy shock. The increase persists for some
time and returns  to its initial  value only after about nine quarters. This
monetary  tightening  results in a statistically  significant  decline  in  the
country's  real GDP. To make it comparable  to the results of the  other
countries  in this  study, this  paper states this  effect in terms of the im-
plied  interest  rate  multiplier.  The  implied  interest  rate  multiplier  is
computed  as the  ratio  of the  maximum  decline  in  real output  to the
increase in the policy rate. This can be interpreted  as the proportional
decline  in real output  per one percentage  point  increase in the policy
rate. The  resulting  implied  multiplier  for Korea is -0.77. This  decline
'IMF-supported  stabilization programs began in August 1997 in Thailand and December 1997 in Korea.
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Figure 2.  Short-term  interest rates
in real GDP reaches its maximum  value eight quarters  after the  policy
shock and recovers thereafter.
On  the  other  hand,  the  price  deflator  remains  inert  for  about
seven to  eight quarters before  finally  declining.  In terms of the  effect
on the country's  exchange  rate, there  is a puzzling  exchange rate de-
preciation  after  the  monetary  contraction.  Efforts  were made  to  re-
place  the  exchange  rate  by its  real value  but  results are  qualitatively
similar.  This finding  should  therefore  be taken with  caution.  While  it
may be suggestive, it should  not be construed  as evidence demonstrat~
ing  the  depreciating  effects of  monetary  tightening  to  the  country's
exchange  rate. This  thorough  analysis of the  interest  rate-exchange
rate nexus is best left to future  research.
This  paper  then examines the  impact  on various components  of
GDP. These components  are inputted  to the baseline model  one  at aPOBRE 237
time.  For  each component,  the  VAR is estimated  with  the  following
ordering:  real GDP less the  component  of interest, the real GDP com-
ponent  of interest,  prices, and the  policy rate. Figure  3b plots the im-
pulse  response functions  of these variables to  the  same positive  one
standard  deviation  shock to the  monetary  policy stance equation.  Re-
sults are also stated in terms  of the implied  interest  rate multiplier.
Both  components  of  real  GDP exhibit  a decline  after  the  mon-
etary  policy  tightening.  However, the  decline  is more  severe in  the
fixed  capital  investment  component.  Real fixed  capital  investment
declines by 1.4 percent while  private  consumption  declines  only by 0.6
percent.  While  this decline  in fixed  capital investment  persists longer,
the  decline  in private  consumption  expenditure  bottoms  out  faster.
This  happens  about five quarters  after the  policy shock. Fixed  capital
investment bottoms  out after about nine  quarters and remains  low for
quite  some time.
In terms of the components  of private  consumption  expenditure
and  fixed  capital  investment,  the  monetary  policy  tightening  has its
most severe effect on private  durable  consumption.  This  private  con-2381
Figure  3b. Korea:  GDP  components
sumption  expenditure  component  also reacts much faster and bottoms
out after four  quarters compared  to private nondurable  consumption.
On  the  other  hand,  equipment  investment  is more  sensitive to mon-
etary policy actions relative  to the  construction  investment.
Next,  this  paper proceed  to the analysis of various  monetary  ag-
gregates and  indicators  of  credit  market  conditions  in Korea. These
variables are also added one at a time  to the baseline model.  When a
monetary  aggregate is included  in the baseline model,  it is included
after  the  policy  rate.  Other  variables, when  included  in the  baseline
VAR model,  are placed before  the  policy rate. Figures 3c and 3d showPOBRE  I  239
Figure  3c. Korea: monetary  aggregates
Figure 3d. Korea: credit  market conditions240  I  PHILIPPINE  jOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
Figure  3d. Cont'd.
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the movements of these variables in response to the same positive one
standard  deviation  shock to the  policy rate.
Monetary  policy  tightening  results in a lower  level of  money in
circulation,  or Ml,  and this response persists for some time. However,
the opposite  response is observed in the case of quasimoney. This  in-
crease in  the  quasimoney  in  Korea  may reflect  the  attractiveness  of
financial  deposits as a result of higher  deposit rates after the monetary
tightening.  Bank reserves also increase in  light  of the  monetary  con-
traction.
Finally, indicators  of credit  market conditions  reveal a tight  credit
market  situation  after the  policy shock. The  lending  rate increases in
Korea and reaches its peak in the fourth  quarter  after the shock. The
external finance  premium  also increases and is very persistent, lasting
for more  quarters  than the  lending  rate.
Philippines  (1981-2000)
Figure  4a plots  the impulse  response functions  of the baseline  model
in the Philippines.  Results show that the Treasury bill rate rises to about
2.7 percent  after the  monetary  policy  shock and this seems to  persist
even after  14 quarters.  This  increase is higher  and  lasts longer  com-
pared to the interest  rate response in Korea. In terms of the impact on
real GDP, the estimated implied  multiplier  for the interest rate is about
minus 0.40 and is only half of the estimated  multiplier  in Korea. How-
ever, both countries'  real output  reach their  maximal  decline  at a rela-
tively the same speed. The long persistence of the interest rate increase
in the Philippines  possibly explains why its real GDP reacts to the mon-
etary tightening  at a relatively the same rate with  that of Korea despite
the  fact that the implied  multiplier  is higher  in Korea.POBRE 24/
Figure 4a.  Philippines:  baseline  VAR (response  to one S.D. innovations  j: 2
S.E.)




















The  price  deflator  in  the  Philippines  remains  relatively  flat  for
about four  to five quarters  after which  it declines.  On the  other hand,
the currency  of the  country  appreciates although  this currency appre-
ciation  happens  after a delay of roughly  five to six quarters.
The  reaction  pattern  of the  different  components of real GDP to
monetary  policy  tightening  in  the  Philippines  is qualitatively  similar
to those found  in Korea.  Figure  4b  plots the  impulse  response func-
tions  of  these  different  components  of  real GDP. Both  private  con-
sumption  expenditure  and fixed  capital  investment  decline  after  the
policy shock, with the latter  reacting  severely to the policy shock albeit
with  some delay of  about  two to three  quarters.  The  implied  interest
rate  multiplier  on fixed  capital  investment  is estimated  to  be  about
minus  0.9 and reaches its maximal  decline  after nine  quarters.
Monetary  policy  tightening  also has its most severe effect on pri-
vate durable  consumption  in  the  Philippines.  Results also show that
this decline  persists longer  in the Philippines  than in Korea. It reaches
its bottom  after 11 quarters  in the  former  but  only after four quarters
in the latter.  In terms of the components  of fixed  capital  investment,2421
Figure 4b.  Philippines:  GDP components
the impulse  response shows that construction  investment reacts slower
than equipment  investment.  Construction  investment initially  increases
but  eventually declines  after three  to four  quarters.
Figures  4c and 4d  show the  movements  of the  other  macroeco-
nomic  variables  in the Philippines.  All  monetary  aggregates generally
decrease after the  monetary  policy  shock and these reactions  happen
quickly. Indicators  of credit  market conditions  also reveal tighter  credit
situations.  Both  lending  rates and the  external  finance  premium  in-
crease as a result of monetary tightening.  These responses also appear
to be persistent.POBRE 243
Figure 4c. Philippines:  monetary aggregatesPHllliPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 244
Figure  4d. Cont'd.
Thailand  (1993-2000)
Figure  Sa plots  the impulse  response functions  of the baseline model
in Thailand.  Mter  a positive one standard deviation  shock to the policy
equation,  Thailand's  overnight  lending  rate increases to 2.06 percent
and returns  to its original  level only after about 6 quarters.  As a result
of the  monetary  tightening,  real  output  declines  at an estimated im-
plied  interest rate multiplier  of -0.33. This decline  in real GDP reaches
its bottom  in  about four  quarters  after the  policy tightening.
Other variables in the baseline model likewise react to such policy
tightening.  The price deflator  in Thailand  remains inert for about three
to four  quarters  before  finally  declining  while  the country's  exchange
rate appreciates  although  this happens  after a delay of  roughly  three
to four  quarters.
In terms of the components  of  real output,  results show that the
decline  in  fixed  capital  investment  is more  severe compared  to  the
decline  in  private  consumption  expenditure.  It  reaches its  maximal
decline  four  to five quarters  after the monetary  policy  shock while pri-
vate consumption  expenditure  bottoms  out  three  to  four  quarter  af-
ter. Based on the  responses of  the  components  of  private  consump-
tion expenditure  and fixed  capital investment, the most severe impacts
are in private durable  consumption  and equipment  investment, respec-
tively. Figure  Sb shows the impulse  response functions  of these differ-
ent  components  of  real  output  to  a monetary  policy  shock in Thai-
land.PaBRE  I  245
Figure  Sa.  Thailand:  baseline  VAR  (response  to one  S.D.  innovations  ~ 2 S.E.]
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Figure 5b. Thailand:  GDP components2461
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Finally,  Figures 5c and 5d show the  movements of the  monetary
aggregates and indicators  of  credit  market conditions.  As in the cases
of  Korea and  the  Philippines,  a strong  liquidity  effect is observed as
indicated  by the persistent decrease in the level of narrow money. There
is likewise  a contemporaneous  decrease in  the  level  of  quasi-money
after the  monetary  policy  tightening.  On the  other  hand,  credit  mar-
ket conditions  in Thailand  seem to become  tighter  as lending  rates
increase  in  response to  a monetary  tightening.  The  peak of the  in-
crease happens  in the  third  and  fourth  quarters  following  the  policy
shock. The  EFP variable  decreases but is statistically insignificant.
Conclusion  and policy  implications
While  there  have been  many empirical  studies on monetary  transmis-
sion mechanism in developed  countries, little  attention  has been given
to  developing  c~untries  such as the  Asian countries.  This  study is anFigure  Sc.  Thailand: monetary  aggregates
Figure 5d. Thailand:  credit  market conditions2481
Figure  5d. Cont'd.
attempt  to fill  this gap. It explores the  monetary  transmission mecha-
nism  in  Korea,  the  Philippines  and  Thailand  using  a series of  VAR
models. Starting  from a baseline model that captures the overall mecha-
nism of a monetary  policy  shock to the economy, the role  of the differ-
ent  components  of real GDP, monetary  aggregates and indicators  of
credit  market conditions  are also examined.  Qualitatively,  there is gen-
erallyan  increase in interest rates and a 'hump-shape'  response of real
GDP following  a monetary  tightening.  Quantitatively,  results indicate
that  a positive  one  standard  deviation  shock to  the  country's  policy
rate causes the  interest  rates to increase to  1.29 percent,  2.7 percent
and 2.06 percent  in Korea, the Philippines  and Thailand,  respectively.
The  corresponding  implied  interest  rate  multipliers  on  real  output
are -0.77 percent  in Korea, -0.40 percent  in the Philippines,  and -0.33
percent  in Thailand.
Moreover,  the impulse  response functions  of the components  of
real GDP and various macroeconomic  variables  reveal some common
patterns.  First is the magnitude  effect  of the  policy  tightening  to the
different  components  of  real GDP. Results of  this  study provide  evi-
dence  that  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  tightening  is stronger  on
fixed  capital  investment  than on private  consumption.  Of the compo-
nents of private  consumption  and fixed  capital  investment,  the more
severe impact  is observed on private  durable  consumption  and equip-
ment investment, respectively. These components also respond quickly
to the  policy  tightening.  This  pattern  is quite  robust across the three
economies  included  in  the  study. However, in  terms  of the  speed ofPOBRE
reaction  to a monetary  policy  tightening,  the components  of real GDP
in the three  countries  exhibit  different  patterns  of movement.  In Ko-
rea, private  consumption  spending bottoms  out faster than fixed  capi-
tal investment  but  in the Philippines,  the reverse is true.  In Thailand,
both private  consumption  and fixed  capital  investment  bottom  out at
relatively  the same time.
Second, there  is a delay in  the  response of  some  GDP compo-
nents to  the  monetary  policy  tightening.  That  is, the  bulk  of the  re-
sponse of some GDP components  occurs after most of the interest rate
effect is already past. For instance, the  interest  rate increases due to
the  policy  shock are virtually  back to their  trend  after nine  quarters  in
Korea,  about  14 quarters  in the Philippines,  and six quarters  in Thai-
land.  However, fixed  capital  investment  reaches its  maximal  decline
only after nine  quarters  in Korea, nine  quarters  in the Philippines  and
five quarters  in Thailand.
Third,  monetary  policy  tightening  is followed  by  tighter  condi-
tions  in the  credit  market.  Lending  rates in the  three  economies  in-
crease in response to the contractionary  policy shock. The  peak of the
increase  on the  lending  rate  in Korea,  the Philippines,  and Thailand
happens  roughly  in the third  and fourth  quarters following  the policy
shock. The  external  finance  premium  variable  also increases in Korea
and in the Philippines.  The  behavior  of the external finance  premium
variable  in Korea and  in the Philippines  is very persistent, lasting  for
more quarters  than the lending  rate. These findings  suggest that mon-
etary policy  may be transmitted  to the  economy other  than the  usual
interest  rate effects. The  significant  response of the  external  finance
premium  to  the  policy  shock suggests that  risk  perception  by banks
plays a crucial  role  in  influencing  their  willingness  to  supply credit.
The  interest rate alone  cannot explain  the generally observed delay in
the response of some GDP components,  resulting  in a poor correspon-
dence  in timing  between interest  rate changes and movements in the
components  of GDP. However, this  poor  correspondence  may be ex-
plained  by the persistence of "tight"  credit  conditions,  as indicated  by
the  external  finance  premium  variable  even after the interest rate has
fallen  back to its original  level. It is interesting  to note that this "tight"
credit  conditions  coincide  with  the  periods  when  the  bulk  of the  re-
sponse of some GDP components occurs. This mechanism,  in conjunc-
tion  with the usual interest channel,  may serve as  a "financial  accelera-
tor"  in  amplifying  the shocks to the  economy  (Bernanke  et al. 1999).PHILIPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 250
This finding  points  out to the  significant  contribution  of the  banking
system in  transmission  process.
Finally,  this  study found  differences  in  terms  of  the  magnitude
and  speed of  reaction  to  a monetary  policy  shock across the  three
economies.  For instance, the response of  GDP components  to a mon-
etary policy  tightening  is generally  faster and  more  severe in Korea
than  in the  Philippines.  While  differences  in  the economic  environ-
ment are suspected contribute  to this observation,  investigating  these
differences and its relation  to monetary transmission mechanism would
be an important  avenue for  further  research.
B~~ed on the foregoing  findings,  the role  of the IMF-prescribed
high-interest-rate  policy or monetary policy tightening  in the 1997 Asian
crisis can hardly be ignored.  Monetary  policy was assigned the role  of
countering  the  downward  pressure on the  already weakening curren-
cies of the  region.  However,  tight  monetary  policy was implemented
in an environment  where  high  debt-equity ratios  in the corporate  sec-
tors as well as structural  problems  made the financial  sector more vul-
nerable  to increases in the interest rates. As a result, there was an over-
whelming  depression  in aggregate demand  in the Asian economies.
Moreover,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1997 crisis, credit  slowdown
was apparent  across all  the  Asian economies.  This  may not  only  be
true  for  the  demand  side but  also for  the  supply side. With  deterio-
rated corporate  balance sheets, it appears that banks may have resorted
to  quantitative  restrictions  in  loan provision.  Thus,  economic  recov-
ery in the  region  has not been supported  by recoveries of  bank cred-
its. In  fact, the so-called V-shaped recoveries  of East Asian economies
after  the  crisis were  not  achieved by the  resurgence  of  endogenous
private  demands, such as consumption  and investment,  but barely sup-
ported  by that of  exogenous demands  (i.e.,  exports and  fiscal stimu-
Ius).  Even as late  as 2002, there  was no  observable  significant  resur-
gence of domestic  credits to the private  sector, particularly  in the case
of Malaysia and Thailand.  Hence, it is difficult  to  claim  that the 1997
monetary  policy  tightening  has little  to  do  with  the  persistent  slow-
down of domestic  investment,  credit supply and output  in these econo-
mies. There  seems to be reason to believe the  credit  crunch  hypoth-
esis and  that the  recovery of credit  supply are indispensable  tools  for
the autonomous  recovery of these economies.POBRE 251
Data Appendix
All  variables used in this  study are quarterly  time  series. The  sample
period  covers the  first  quarter  of 1981  through  the  third  quarter  of
2000 for  Korea  and  the  Philippines,  and  the  first  quarter  of  1993
through  the  third  quarter  of  2000 for  Thailand.  The  shorter  sample
used for Thailand  is primarily  due to data availability. Thailand  started
to publish  its quarterly  national  accounts data only in 1993. Except for
the interest  rates, all variables are expressed in logs and are seasonally
adjusted. Sources and definitions  of the variables are discussed below.
Data were  obtained  from  the  International  Financial  Statistics
(IFS) of the International  Monetary Fund, from the homepages of the
Bank of Korea  (http://www.bok.o7:kr)  and the  Bank of Thailand  (http:/
/www.bot.07:th),  and from the National  Accounts of the Philippines  pub-
lished  by the  National  Statistical  Coordination  Board.
The  series on short-term  interest  rate is the  money  market  rate
for  Korea and the  91-day Treasury bill  rate for  the Philippines.  Both
series are obtained  from  the IFS data, lines 60B and 60C, respectively.
The  interest rate for Thailand  is the overnight  interbank  lending  rates
(average) downloaded  from  the  Bank of Thailand's  homepage.  The
nominal  exchange rate is in terms of national  currency  per US dollar
obtained  from  the IFS; line  RF for  each national  series. Real GDP and
its components are obtained  from the country's respective central bank
database and publications.  The output  series is in terms of  1995  prices
for  Korea, 1985 prices  for  the  Philippines,  and  1988 prices  for  Thai-
land.  The  components  examined  in  this  study are  real private  con-
sumption  and  fixed  capital  investment.  Private  durable  and  nondu-
rable  consumption  components  of  the  former  and  construction  in-
vestment and equipment  investment  components  of the latter are also
examined.  However, the  presentation  of the  GDP components  is not
uniform  across the  three  countries  so these  components  are  trans~
formed  to  limit  the analysis to  the above variables. In the Philippines
and Thailand,  private  nondurable  consumption  includes  expenditure
on food,  beverages, tobacco,  clothing  and  footwear,  and  fuel,  light,
and water. Private durable  consumption  includes  spending  on equip-
ment and furnishings.  In Korea, private  consumption  components  are
disaggregated into  nondurable,  durable, semidurable  and services. In
this  study, private  durable  consumption  includes  both  durable  and
semidurable  consumption.  Other  than  this, no  other  transformation
is made for Korea. The  presentation  on the components  of fixed  capi-
tal investment is less  problematic.  Definition  is generally similar across2521
the  three  countries.  The  implicit  price  deflator  is computed  as the
ratio  of the  nominal  GDP to real GDP (both  seasonally adjusted),  and
then multiplied  by 100.
Monetary  aggregates for  all countries  are obtained  from  the IFS.
The  series on bank reserve for  Korea is from  line  20 while  the series
on monetary base is from  line  14. Narrow  money and quasimoney are
from  lines  34 and 35, respectively.
Finally,  deposit and lending  rates are likewise obtained  from  the
IFS. In particular,  these rates refer to the  one-year time  deposit rate at
Deposit  Money Banks (DMBs),  and minimum  lending  rates on DMBs
for Korea and the 61-90 day deposit rate and average lending  rate for
the Philippines.  The  series on deposit rate is from  line  60L while  the
series on the lending  rate is from  line  60P for  each country.PODRE 253
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